Charlie Battery - Kleingartach

Ready Room

There was a Ready Room with bunks where on duty personnel could sleep when the battery was on alert status. In Rhode Island “hot battery” meant we had to be able to fire a missile in 15 minutes from being alerted. Then there was a 2 hour battery and finally “cold battery” when there was time for more extensive maintenance. In Germany “hot battery” meant being ready to fire in 5 minutes, followed by 30 minute battery and 2 hour battery.

Operation and Training

There was a certain sequence of events which were repeated each time a missile was actually fired (only during ASP in peacetime) or in simulations.

A target was assigned by battalion, coordinates were reported to the BC Trailer, the ACQ operator found the target on his radar, and pushed the “designate” switch, “designating” the target to the TTR. The computer then sent a signal to the TTR antenna to slew around to the proper target coordinates so that the TTR could track the target. The TTR operators tweaked their controls to find and continue to track the target if need be.

In the meantime the MTR had locked on to the readied missile. At the proper time, the Battery Control Officer flipped the “fire” switch and the missile was launched. Information as to the target location was sent to the computer by the TTR, which in turn told the MTR how to guide the missile to target. This coordination plotted, what was then known as the Predicted Point of Intercept, or PPI.

The Nike system was therefore known as a “command guidance system”. We trained constantly so that we could acquire and track all types of targets in minimum time. From time to time we had operations checks (“Ops Checks”) from battalion. The team from battalion would come to simulate an actual alert to see if we were at that time capable of firing in 5 minutes or 30 minutes depending on our alert status.

These checks were always supposed to be complete surprises. In practice they never were. We never failed to get a warning they were coming, probably because an Ops Check failure was such a serious matter. I was told a failure meant the battery commander was relieved. And clearly the battalion commander would look bad as well. We never had a failure. And I really don't think we would have ever had a failure even without the benefit of a warning.

Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)

The Nike system radars were vulnerable to electronic jamming by enemy aircraft. As a consequence, various equipment field revisions were made from time to time to counter jamming efforts. I was sent to a special ECM school at Ft. Bliss. Some of these counter measures involved quick changes of radar frequency to “dump” the jamming. TTR operators could sometimes manually track targets if jamming did not allow automatic tracking. While in Rhode Island we once ran an exercise with the Air Force. They were able to completely black out our Acquisition Radar such that we were incapable of finding their aircraft.

I don't know exactly how they did it, but other than using electronic jamming one very good way to confuse radar is to drop “chaff.” Chaff consists of hundreds of small pieces of aluminum or tinfoil dropped from an airplane. It slowly floats upon the breezes as it drops down. The radar bounces off so many of these pieces at the same time that it is completely jammed.

And of course the Air Force would never have used its most advanced methods against us in an exercise. Who knows what the Soviet Union had? I did learn at ECM school that they had an air-to-ground missile system that used our radar beam to guide their ATG missile right down to us! And of course, we could not track aircraft below certain altitudes. That is why our own B-52's fly in at levels just above tree tops, or “under the radar.” Still, as I well remember one officer telling me, “If we ever have to use it, the system has failed.” Thank goodness we never did have to use it. It was a deterrent.

Tactical Capabilities

When I first went to Germany the Nike command structure reported directly to United States Army Europe. Later that was changed so we reported to 7th Army. The Nike Hercules (but not the Nike Ajax) had surface to surface capability as well as surface to air capability. Soon after we became a part of 7th Army (seven steps to hell!) their commanders learned that the Hercules could be fired surface to surface.

This fact generated much interest, so that we became a part of 7th Army field exercises, being assigned ground targets which we simulated destroying, much to the delight of 7th Army. I recall that we would see these glowing letters from 7th Army posted on our bulletin boards. In some cases we actually received some type of special commendation. Of course we never left our site, while the 7th Army infantry, artillery, armored units, and their various support groups moved around in the field in all sorts of weather.

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